The Great Recession led to marked declines in state revenue. In this paper we investigate whether (and how) local school districts modified their funding and taxing decisions in response to state aid declines in the post-recession period. Our results reveal that school districts responded to state aid cuts in the post-recession period by countering these cuts. Relative to the pre-recession period, a unit decrease in state aid was associated with a relative increase in local funding. To further probe the school district role, we explore whether the property tax rate, which reflects decisions of districts facing budgetary needs, responded to state aid cuts. We find that relative to the pre-recession period, the post-recession period was characterized by a strong negative relationship between property tax rate and state aid per pupil. We also find important heterogeneities in these responses by region, property wealth, and importance of STAR revenue in district budget.
Introduction
The effects of the Great Recession on the U.S. economy were both widespread and dramatic.
State and local governments were hit hard by the loss of income tax, property tax, and sales tax revenues that resulted from the recession. State and local governments generally provide the vast majority of public school funding, so the recession left schools especially vulnerable to funding losses. Chakrabarti and Livingston (2013a) finds that there were multi-year declines in state aid to education following the Great Recession. The objective of this paper is to study the interactions of state funding and local revenue and determine whether the relationship between the two changed in the post-recession period. More specifically, we examine whether the declines in state aid after the recession affected local districts' fund-raising behavior. Did local governments respond to cuts in state funding for education, and if so, how? Did they use local revenue and property taxes to counter the decline of state aid?
It is not necessarily clear a priori how the Great Recession and the resulting cuts in state aid would have affected local property taxes and revenues. On the one hand, school districts faced a shortfall in revenue from the state relative to what they normally received and they may have wanted to replace some of the lost state funds with local funds to avoid having to cut services. On the other hand, the decline in state aid came precisely when property values were plummeting, diminishing the tax base and making it harder to increase property tax revenues.
Moreover, many people had lost their jobs, likely making them more averse to increased property taxes. Ultimately, how the recession affected the relationship between state aid and property taxes is an empirical one, and we aim to leverage our dataset to provide some insight in this paper.
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The paper most directly related to ours is Dye and Reschovsky (2008) . It analyzes the effect of cuts in state aid resulting from the 2001 recession on property tax revenues raised by districts and local governments. They find that, on average, school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for every dollar lost in state aid. However, Dye and Reschovsky find that the relationship between state aid and local property taxes varies a great deal across states-26 states had a positive correlation between yearly changes in state aid and property taxes from 1978-2000, including New York.
While this paper has been greatly informed by Dye and Reschovsky (2008) and builds on it, it differs in some key ways. One is the granularity of the data-while Dye and Reschovsky used state-level data, we exploit district-level data. We also have a longer panel spanning eight years (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , while the main analysis in Dye analyze was far less severe than the Great Recession. Yet another important difference is that in addition to overall impacts, we leverage our district-level data to investigate whether there were heterogeneities in patterns by poverty and region-a line of inquiry that was not possible with state-level data in Dye and Reschovsky (2008) . Finally, we employ a more rigorous estimation strategy. We start by utilizing district fixed effects estimation (FE) to control for time-invariant unobserved district characteristics that might affect the relationship. Next, to further eliminate any endogeneity problems, we pursue an instrumental variables estimation strategy (IV).
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We find robust evidence that local revenue and property taxes responded to the decline in state aid following the recession. In the post-recession period, a unit decrease in state aid per pupil led to a relative increase in both local revenue per pupil and property tax revenue per pupil in comparison to the pre-recession period. More specifically, we find that in comparison to the pre-recession period, a dollar decrease in per pupil state aid led to a relative increase of 19 cents in local funding per pupil, and a relative increase of 14 cents in property tax revenue per pupil.
9
To further investigate the role of local control, we explore whether changes in local revenue were associated with changes in the actual property tax rate. We find that relative to the pre-recession period, a decline in state aid per pupil led to a relative increase in property tax rates. We believe that by separately considering the tax rate we are able to determine whether the change in property tax revenue was a result of local tax policy decisions or simply changes in property values. As outlined above, we do find that districts changed their tax rates in response to state aid shifts.
In addition to analyzing overall local responses to changes in state funding, we also investigate whether there were heterogeneities in responses across regions, and by property wealth. We find interesting variations in the extents of local responses between wealthy and less property wealthy districts and between regions. In particular, the general pattern above --that districts countered state aid cuts following the Great Recession with local and property tax revenue increases (relative to the pre-recession period) --seems to stem mostly from the responses of the high wealth districts. This is largely due to the interaction of state aid cuts with the existing STAR program. The STAR program operates like a matching grant, lowering voters' 9 These estimates are obtained from specifications that include school district fixed effects. Instrumental variables estimates-which are qualitatively similar-reveal that a dollar decrease in per pupil state aid led to a relative increase of 24 cents in local funding per pupil, and a relative increase of 20 cents in property tax revenue per pupil. tax prices and thereby increasing their demand for education. High wealth districts benefited the most from STAR because of the matching grant nature of the program (Eom et al. forthcoming) .
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the high wealth districts have been able to leverage the matching grant nature of STAR to replace traditional state aid with a combination of additional property tax revenues and state aid they receive as a result of STAR.
To further explore and understand the effects of the STAR program, we conduct a heterogeneity analysis based on the relative importance of STAR revenue in district budgets, and indeed find that the districts with the lowest share of STAR revenue have weaker responses to state aid changes after the recession. This indicates that there is some subsidizing effect of STAR that has encouraged districts, particularly the more wealthy districts, to increase local and property tax revenue in an effort to take advantage of the "matching grant" nature of STAR.
Background

Economic Background
The bursting of the housing bubble in 2007 and subsequent financial crisis led to a surge in unemployment and a decline in house prices. The rise in unemployment and fall of consumption meant less income and sales tax revenue for state governments, while the collapse of housing prices led to property tax revenue declines. New York's unemployment rate increased from 4.6% in 2006 to a peak of 8.5% in 2010. Since the peak in 2010, unemployment has fallen from its peak to 7.4% nationally and 7.5% in New York as of July 2013. 10 To counteract declines in state and local revenues, the federal government enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, also known as the stimulus package), much of which was targeted at bolstering state and local government finances. However, most of the stimulus funds were used 10 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics/Haver Analytics.
in the first two years after the recession. As the economic recovery stalled, many local governments faced fiscal tightening.
School Funding Overview
Funding for public schools comes from three main sources: federal aid, state aid, and local revenue. Out of these three sources, New York districts received approximately 3% of their funding from federal aid, 40% from state aid, and 57% from local revenue on average in the immediate pre-recession year (2008) (see Figure 1 ). 16 For the remainder of the paper school years will be referred to using the year of the spring semester. divide them into quartiles based on that ratio. We then investigate whether there were differences in local responses across these quartiles.
Empirical Analysis
Using school district data from 2005 through 2012, we investigate whether the postrecession period was characterized by a different local revenue response to changes in state aid 17 Property value refers to the equalized assessed value.
relative to the pre-recession period. Specifically, did the state aid cuts prompted by the Great Recession lead districts to counter those cuts by increasing local revenue and/or property tax responses (relative to the pre-recession period)? It is worth noting here that our period of analysis, especially the start of our period of analysis, has a distinct advantage. Recall that the STAR program was enacted in 1997 and took full effect in 2002, so it was completely phased in before our period of analysis. Thus, in our analysis, STAR is part of the status quo, rather than a confounding factor. Moreover, controlling for pre-recession patterns (using pre-recession data approximately $12,000 per-pupil in local revenue, with $9,000 coming from property taxes. The average property tax rate was approximately 1.6% ($16 per $1,000 of property value).
Examining the Relationship between State and Local sources of Funding
We begin our analysis by examining the overall trends of our variables of interest. response to the decline in state aid. We explore this relationship more formally below.
Like most analyses of local public good provision, our analyses (and specifications below) are based on intuition derived from the median voter literature. 19 Under an assumption of single peakedness of preferences, the median voter model predicts that a majority rule voting system will select the outcome most preferred by the median voter -that is, the median voter will be pivotal in election outcomes. Our specification below captures the preference of the median voter; specifically we seek to understand the choice of the median voter facing a cut in state aid.
Where is a school finance indicator (local revenue per pupil, property tax revenue per pupil)
for each school district i in year t; StateAid_pp it is the per-pupil state aid, The results from estimation of specification (1) are presented in Table 2 . Looking at column 1, while state aid per-pupil had a positive relationship with local funding prior to the recession, that relationship weakened after the recession. We find similar results for property tax revenue (column 2). This indicates that local governments responded by countering changes in state funding with changes in local funding after the recession hit.
To further understand the relationship, we split the recession interaction into individual year interactions to study the effects separately in each post-recession year. If the negative relationship we found in the first specification occurs in only some of the post-recession years that will be revealed in a more flexible specification such as specification (2) below, which allows the effect to vary across the different post-recession years. Distinguishing between individual year effects also allows us to investigate whether the relationship changed over years in the post-recession period. The specification is as follows:
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This is in keeping with the accounting method used in our data source (the New York State Comptroller's Office).
In this model, the coefficient on state aid per pupil captures the relationship between state aid per pupil and local revenue per pupil during the pre-recession period. The coefficients β 2 to β 5 capture the changes (if any) in this relationship in each of the post-recession years.
The results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 . Each post-recession interaction year has a negative coefficient, and each of them is statistically different from zero. The magnitudes are smaller than the pre-recession coefficient on state aid per pupil, which indicates that in the post-recession years local revenue per pupil would still decline as state aid per pupil declined, but it would do so less strongly than it would have before the recession.
These results imply that although during the post-recession period a unit decline in state aid per pupil would still be associated with a decline in local revenue per pupil (and property tax revenue per pupil), the extent of the latter declines were markedly smaller. In other words, it seems that the local government responded to cuts in state aid by increasing the local funding effort, compared to the pre-recession period.
Investigating the Relationship between State Aid and the Property Tax Rate
To explore whether the changes in property tax revenue we observed earlier were related to changes in the property tax rates, we next investigate the impacts of change in state aid on them. In particular, we want to see whether the patterns above were associated with relative increases in property tax rates in the post-recession period.
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The trend graph in Figure 5 plots the property tax rate, which shows a sharp decline leading up to the recession, and then an equally sharp increase after 2010, which points to a potential response to the downward movement of state aid. Next, we investigate the relationship between state aid per pupil and property tax rate more formally, using specifications (3) and (4) below.
This analysis also draws on the median voter literature-given intergovernmental revenues (state aid and federal aid), the property tax rate choice of the median voter depends on the assessed value of property. Therefore, in specifications (3) and (4), we include (assessed) property value per pupil as an additional regressor. Specification (3) constrains the post-recession tax rate response (to a decline in state aid per pupil) to vary linearly with time. In contrast, specification (4) estimates a more flexible specification where the property tax rate impacts are allowed to vary non-linearly over the various post-recession years.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3 . They reveal that prior to the recession state aid had a positive relationship with the tax rate; after the recession that relationship diminished sharply. Decomposing the recession interaction into separate year interactions (column 2), we see that the pattern holds for each post-recession year, and in fact the 14 substitution grew stronger over each year. In other words, the results reveal that facing state aid cuts following the Great Recession, the districts responded with relative increases in the property tax rate (in comparison to the pre-recession period), in an effort to counter the declines in state aid. 23, 24 The table also shows that (as might be expected), an increase in property value per pupil is associated with a decrease in tax rates, and vice versa. This negative relationship continues to hold in rest of the paper, and in most cases (unlike in Table 3 ) the relationship is statistically significant.
To sum, the results in Tables 2 and 3 show that in the aftermath of the Great Recession, districts facing state aid cuts responded with relative increases in local revenues, and in the property tax rate. While this is the aggregate picture, different groups of districts may have responded differently -we next investigate if, among other factors, differences in property wealth and importance of STAR mattered in the extent of offsets the districts were able to make.
Were There Heterogeneities in Local Response to Declines in State Aid?
In addition to looking at how changes in state aid affected changes in local funding across all districts in the state, we dive deeper and examine whether there were variations in local responses by district property value (or wealth) and across districts in different regions of the state. Moreover, to understand how STAR interacted with property tax and local revenue 23 Note that while fixed effects control for district specific time-invariant attributes, there may be endogeneity problems caused by unobserved time-varying characteristics that are correlated with local revenue and state aid. To address this endogeneity, we implement an instrumental variables (IV) strategy, using the four-year lag of state aid per-pupil as the instrument for state aid per pupil. The IV results remain qualitatively similar to each of the corresponding fixed effects results reported in the paper; to save space we only report IV results corresponding to tables 2 and 3 in appendix tables A1 and A2. The other IV results are available on request. 24 There may be cause for concern in estimations of (3) and (4) if the property value is endogenous. To address this potential issue, we carry out two alternative estimations using pre-recession data on property values. In the first strategy (following Chakrabarti and Roy (2012)), we use 2005 property value (the first year available in our data) and interact it with year dummies to get variation over time-the purpose is to obtain a measure of property value that is exogenous. The second strategy is based on the same intuition, but uses 2008 property value and its interactions with year dummies (note that 2008 is the immediate pre-recession year). The results from these two strategies (not presented here, but available on request) mirror closely those obtained above, giving us further confidence in these results.
responses of districts, we conduct a heterogeneity analysis based on the relative importance of STAR revenue in district budgets.
Heterogeneities by Property Values
Based on the median voter theorem, one would expect the responses of higher income or property wealthy districts to differ from lower income or property poor districts. High property wealth districts contain more wealthy families and a wealthier median voter who would have a higher demand for education, and hence a higher propensity to counter any state aid cuts.
Moreover, property wealthy districts also have the means to provide for more revenues at a lower cost to them, by virtue of having a higher property tax base.
One would expect STAR to play a role here too. As Eom et al. (forthcoming) points out, STAR acts as a matching grant lowering voters' tax prices. Because of this, one would expect a higher tax rate response in districts with higher property value wealth because the same tax rate increase yields a larger dollar increase in property tax revenue, some of which is reimbursed by the state through STAR. Additionally, STAR is adjusted up by the sales price differential factor (SPDF) in counties where the median home sale prices exceeds the statewide median sales price (i.e., the higher property value districts).
In Table 4 we present results for our local revenue and property tax regressions where we allow the impacts to vary by the property wealth of the district. We divide districts into quartiles based on their per-pupil property values in 2005 (the first year of our panel). We find that the wealthiest districts have the largest negative post-recession relationship (relative to the preprogram period), indicating that they offset cuts in state aid more than poorer districts. This pattern is consistent with our discussion above. The more wealthy districts have a higher demand for education, have the means to tax themselves more, and receive more money from STAR---16 these factors have likely led to larger offsets of state aid cuts (by local and property tax funding) in these districts. Meanwhile, the responses of the less wealthy districts are smaller, both economically and statistically. These districts may not have had the resources to counter state aid cuts as much. There is still some evidence of offsets, but these offsets are smaller than those in the wealthier districts.
A similar pattern is borne out in the tax rate results in Table 5 . Relative to the prerecession period, the wealthier districts increased their tax rates considerably more after the recession to compensate for state aid declines.
To summarize the results so far, the overall patterns in Tables 2 and 3 show that in the post-recession period districts facing state aid cuts responded with relative increases in local funding and in the property tax rate. The findings in Tables 4 and 5 reveal that these patterns were driven primarily by the high wealth districts. It appears that the high wealth districts were able to take advantage of the matching grant nature of STAR to replace traditional state aid with a combination of additional property tax revenues and state aid they received as a result of STAR. In other words, the residents of wealthy districts were able to leverage a unique aspect of New York's school finance system to replace, at least partially, one form of state aid with a second, indirect form of state aid. Residents of poorer districts, where the matching rate is lower, did not respond in the same way.
Heterogeneities by Regions
New York is a large and very diverse state, and districts in different areas may have faced different situations following the recession. We examine heterogeneities in our results across a few key regions of the state-the Central region, the Finger Lakes region, and the Hudson Valley region (see section 3 for more details). These results are presented in Tables 6 and 7 . We see that the Hudson Valley school districts had a stronger negative post-recession relationship between state aid and property tax revenue than the other two regions did-in other words, a unit fall in state aid per pupil after the recession led to a larger increase in property tax revenue in Hudson
Valley region than the other two regions. This may be because the Hudson Valley, which includes Westchester County, is in general wealthier than the more rural Central and Finger Lakes regions. However, none of the differences in coefficients across the regions are statistically significant. Results in Table 7 reveal that the decline in state aid was countered by increases in local tax rates in all three regions. Of note is that the tax rate changes were not statistically different between these regions.
Thus, all of these regions follow the same general pattern that the overall sample follows.
This indicates that the effects of the recession and responses were not concentrated just in one part of the state, but were widespread.
Heterogeneities by STAR Revenue Shares
Because the STAR program explicitly subsidizes districts that increase property taxes and property tax revenue, we might expect to see different responses in districts where STAR revenue plays a larger role in their budget. To test this, we calculate the ratio of STAR revenue to state aid in each district and classify districts into quartiles based on their ratio in 2005 (the highest quartile representing the districts with the largest STAR to state aid ratio). We then estimate our model of district response separately for each quartile.
These results are presented in Tables 8 and 9 . Looking at Table 8 , the bottom quartile (those with the least STAR revenue relative to state aid) had a weaker pre-recession relationship between state aid and local revenue (or property tax revenue) than the other quartiles, indicating less willingness or ability to increase local revenue or property taxes as state aid was increasing.
Furthermore, their post-recession response (relative to the pre-recession period) is statistically insignificant, whereas the other three quartiles have both economically and statistically significant compensatory local and property tax revenue responses to post-recession cuts in state aid. We see the strongest post-recession response in the highest quartile. This is possibly due to a combination of factors---they enjoy greater STAR subsidies, they likely have higher assessed values so a given tax rate yields higher property tax revenue, they have a higher demand for education, and they have the means to tax themselves more.
A similar pattern plays out in the tax rate response (Table 9) , where the bottom quartile does not show any statistically significant tax rate response in the post-recession period, although the coefficients are still negative. The top three quartiles have economically much stronger postrecession responses that are statistically significant in most cases.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed how the Great Recession changed the relationship between state aid and local revenues in New York, specifically looking at how changes in state aid before and after the recession had varying impacts on local revenue and property taxes. This analysis furthers our understanding of how districts make spending decisions given changes in their funding sources.
Our analysis uncovered some interesting patterns. We find that the relationship between state aid per pupil and local revenue (or property tax revenue) changed markedly with the Great Recession. The post-recession era was characterized by local governments proactively increasing taxes (relative to that in the pre-recession period) for a decrease in state aid per pupil. More specifically, relative to the pre-recession period, a dollar decline in state aid resulted in a 14 cent increase in property tax revenue and a 19 cent increase in local revenue. By allowing the effects of state aid to vary across years, we find that this pattern is not driven by a single year effect, but is a consistent pattern reflected in each year after the recession.
By separately analyzing the driver of property tax revenue-the property tax rate-we find that changes in state aid per-pupil consistently affected the tax rate, suggesting that districts did respond to changes in state aid. In addition, the compensatory relationship became stronger over the years.
Our analysis above reveals an important role of property taxes in school finance. We find that property taxes acted as a stabilizing force-school districts facing cuts in state funding responded by countering these state aid cuts through increased property taxes. But there were important variations in the responses of school districts. Investigating whether the response to state aid cuts varied with property value, we find that wealthier districts raised property tax rate by more following the recession and raised greater funds through local and property tax revenue.
We argue that this pattern relates to the STAR program -being essentially a matching grant, STAR allowed high wealth districts to increase their spending at a relatively lower cost to themselves. Residents of poorer districts, where the matching rate was lower, do not seem to have responded in the same way. Consequently, school funding depended to a much greater extent on property taxes. Our results for New York show that local governments responded by countering the state aid cuts and replenishing some of the lost funds. However, the local revenue offsets were substantially smaller than the actual state funding declines. This phenomenon of incomplete offsets is likely to put pressure on funding and spending in schools. In addition, because property taxes are unpopular politically, several recent laws such as New York's property tax rate cap (that went into effect in the 2012-13 school year) have limited the ability of districts to raise local funds through increasing property tax rates. These would further intensify pressure on districts trying to adequately fund K-12 education. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. See specifications (1)- (2) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. See specifications (3)- (4) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. The first quartile represents the districts with the lowest per-pupil property values. See specifications (1)- (2) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. The first quartile represents the districts with the lowest per-pupil property values. See specifications (3)- (4) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. See specifications (1)- (2) in the text. 30 Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. The first quartile represents the districts with the lowest ratio of STAR revenue to state aid. See specifications (1)- (2) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. The first quartile represents the districts with the lowest ratio of STAR revenue to state aid. See specifications (3)- (4) in the text. Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by school district are in parentheses. All regressions include year fixed effects, racial composition, the percent of students eligible for free or reduced price lunch, per-pupil federal aid, and the percent of district funding from state aid. All financial variables are expressed in real terms. See specifications (1)- (4) 
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